After India exploded 5 nuclear devices, a lively debate has
been started in India (and elsewhere) on issues like nuclear testing,
CTBT, economic consequences etc. However, after weeks of incessant
talk shows and columns on these topics, it is becoming apparent that
the debate is being led by technically uninformed loud mouths whose
sole qualification may be `peace activist' or `environmental crusader'.
Even the tag `scientist' is meaningless if he/she doesn't know the
technical details of CTBT, NPT, subcritical tests or fourth generation nukes.
Worse, the political personalities are not technically well informed enough
to counter this set and sometimes even second their opinions if it suits them
politically. After the Pakistan tests, decibel levels shot up further.
While this reflects very well on the freedom of expression enjoyed
in our society, it does place a certain responsibility on those better
informed to raise the level of public awareness.
A regular feature of most debates seem to be a set of rhetorical
questions whose answers are taken to be evident. Sadly, they are evident
one way for the unwary and another way for the well informed, and therein
lies the danger. Just as a lie if repeated often may become the truth, a
falsehood not contradicted long enough may also become the truth. This
article is an attempt to answer some of these questions. The first part
is structured as Question-Answer. Inevitably, some answers need to address
fairly technical issues or require elaboration. In order to maintain continuity,
these technical issues/elaborations have been clubbed together under
`Part-II Technical Issues'. The Question-Answer section contains many references
to this section (as [See This Topic]) but the reader may skip them on the
first pass. The issues discussed here are more technical rather than
political / social. The author believes that only after the technical nuances
have been mastered can the latter issues be meaningfully dealt with.
- CTBT - Technical specs:
Reference -
Los Alamos Study Group
The treaty bars all signatories from conducting all nuclear tests that
involve any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
Exactly what "nuclear explosions" are prohibited will be determined by
parties to the CTBT, and possibly the International Court of Justice, on
the basis of the treaty text, the (sparse) negotiating record, and the
future practice of all states parties, including their statements at review
conferences. As with NPT, the nuclear weapon states (NWS) have inserted
escape clauses for themselves. The NWS have stated that the treaty bars
explosions involving a self-sustaining chain reaction. Accordingly, they
claim, subcritical tests are permitted though they involve the production
of neutrons by fissile materials. However, such tests involve a nuclear
"explosion" though a chain reaction does not occur. It remains to be
determined whether the CTBT bars tests of possible "fourth-generation"
weapons in which fissile material is "burned", without a chain reaction,
at a rapid rate resulting in yields of tens or 100s of tons.
- CTBT and UN:
After India's categorical refusal to sign the CTBT draft in Geneva, there
have been several indications that efforts would be made to by-pass or
coerce India.
Extract from the Los Alamos Study Group:
The NWS could ratify the CTBT and then seek to persuade/coerce India to
endorse the treaty. This appears to be the present US strategy.
More direct indications come from the Special briefing on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Washington, DC, April 7, 1998. John Holum,
Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms, while answering a query on
the future of CTBT had this to say:
QUESTION: Back on the CTBT, you spoke earlier about a review
conference in September 1999, if you can't get all 44 countries to
ratify the treaty. Assuming that conference becomes necessary,
what specific options are available at that time to bring the
treaty into force? My understanding is that the conference would
not be able to waive the original requirements stating that all 44
countries would have to ratify it. What is the current thinking
about what measures could be taken to accelerate the ratification
conference if that becomes necessary?
ACTING UNDER SECRETARY HOLUM: "You're getting a little ahead of the
game, I think, because we need to ratify first before we can even
go. So if we're not going, it won't be fruitful to develop a
strategy.
"One thing that such a conference would do is presumably talk about
a political strategy. The test ban, as most of you probably know,
takes 44 specifically named countries before it can enter into
force; 41 of those 44 have signed the treaty, and we expect
they'll ratify. Three - India, Pakistan and North Korea - have not
signed, and I'm sure an intense focus of the conference, assuming
the other 41 have ratified by then, will be, what is the right
political strategy to engage the other three, to bring them on
board?
"Some people have suggested that the countries who are present
there could make a decision to adopt a different test ban treaty.
They couldn't amend this one, but they could adopt on their own a
test ban treaty that would have all the same provisions but a
different entry into force provision. That's a theoretical
possibility, I suppose. Or they could decide on provisional
application. I think any of those kinds of options would be very
difficult to pursue because the entry into force provisions of the
treaty were the product of very intense negotiations and they
wouldn't be likely adjusted by countries that presumably will have
ratified by then. Certainly, the two who ratified last week, who
have just ratified - the UK and France - have strong views on that
question."
End quote.
It is telling that just about every possibility was discussed save
that of accommodating India's concern!
- US and CTBT:
The CTBT, when originally proposed, would have led to (forced) nuclear
disarmament. At that time not enough was known to either design new
weapons or verify safety of old weapons without explosive testing.
That is when the NWS opposed CTBT. Subsequently a technological
threshold was breached whereby, if one had sufficient data, there
would be no more need for testing. Tests were now purely the requirement
of nuclear aspirants. Suddenly the NWS were gung-ho on CTBT. Even then,
France and China had to scramble up the technological ladder at the
last minute with their 1996 tests. Once again, we turn to Holum (see
above) for a clear exposition of the US perspective. (Note: The
quotes from Holum only do not imply that the other NWS were any
less cynical. It is just that the US is more open.)
"...I want to underscore here the importance of ratifying this treaty
for one of our most important international security challenges,
and that's to intercept and prevent the spread of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and missiles to more countries."
"...You can make a nuclear weapon without testing, but it's a
much bigger challenge, much more difficult to make weapons of
small enough size to be of great danger to us. We had to dig a
trench under a B-29 bomber to put our first nuclear weapons on
board. Without testing, it's an insurmountable challenge,
virtually, to get them down to the sizes and weights that would be
of particular danger to us."
"...So then the argument becomes, well, if we're not going to test
anyway, why not hold the rest of the world to the same standards?"
Now for a final quote, which I think takes the cake. Having just
testified that the US would not be inconvenienced by CTBT anymore
since it no longer needed explosive tests, Holum gives the
following `ethical' reason for the US signing CTBT:
"... Remember that the non-nuclear weapons states have considered,
since the time the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated in the
1960s, that part of the bargain was an agreement on the part of
the nuclear weapons states to engage in good-faith efforts towards
disarmament; and the Test-Ban Treaty was specifically mentioned at
the time in the late 1960s as part of the bargain. So, in order
for us to make our case effectively for non-proliferation, we need
to hold up our end of the bargain; and the test ban is part of it."
Number of Nukes: (Time magazine May 25, 1998)
Known
US 12,070
Russia 22,500
UK 380
France 500
China 450
Presumed [These are just guesses and have no official sanctity]
India about 65
Israel 64-112
Pakistan 15-25
As the numbers show, only US-Russia were in a `race'. The rest
were content with just deterrence. It also shows that US-Russia
SALT talks are about removing redundancy, not renouncing N weapons.
- Bang for the Buck:
Reference: http://h-net2.msu.edu/~diplo/reGardner.htm
The following is an extract from the above source.
In his State of the Union message, January 7, 1954, Eisenhower's two
leading defense planning considerations dealt with the new nuclear
weapons technology.
"First, while determined to use atomic power to serve the usages of peace,
we take into full account our great and growing number of nuclear weapons
and the most effective means of using them against an aggressor ...
[including] the tactical use of our nuclear weapons .... Second, the
usefulness of these new weapons creates new relationships between men and
materials. These new relationships permit economies in the use of men as we
build forces suited to our situation in the world today ...."
(p. 5, _DAFR_, 1954)
In sum,
- significant planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons
in Western Europe by the U.S., and thus, NATO was underway by 1951,
- Eisenhower supported this approach from the moment he was first
informed of its possibilities and,
- the features most appealing to
Eisenhower were the ability to `get more bang for the buck' -- ,i.e., more
than he could get from comparable conventional weapons, and the possibility
to save the lives of his troops -- men he had spent his entire career
protecting.
- China and its Neighbors:
Much is said about the recent reduction of tension with China. Much
less is said about its past track record of hostilities following such
`friendship' as discovered by India('62), USSR('69) and Vietnam('79).
Further, while USSR and even tiny Vietnam held their own, India was routed.
These lessons of history seem lost on our die-hard China apologists.
Recent events in Taiwan and Spratleys also indicate that while friendship
with China is desirable, keeping one's guard up is also essential.
Contrast the flippancy with which many Indians dismiss the Chinese threat
(`It happened 35 yrs ago') with the pragmatism with which US has dealt with
Japan & Germany. Even though they were *defeated*, more than 50 yrs ago, they
are still denied their own military/armament build-up. If defeated, and
*politically reformed* Japan and Germany are still suspect, shouldn't we be
wary of an undefeated and unreformed China that is getting stronger by the day?
The Latency Period: